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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
ST;._TE OF UTAH 
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
THE GRA>JITE SCHOOL DISTRICT, a 
body politic of the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Apoellant, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic and ARTHUR MONSON, 
Salt Lake County Treasurer, 
Defendants, Respondents, 
and Cross Appellants. 
Case :-ro. 17175 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF - APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action on appeal before the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah seeking judicial review of a Judgment after 
=~ial before the Third Judicial District Court of the State of 
Utah and upon decisions rendered by Judge David K. Winder upon 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to determine liability and 
Judge Jay E. Banks upon trial for damages. The Judgment herein 
reversed Judgment of David K. Winder, determined no liability 
for damages and dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint. 
DISPOSITION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Plaintiff-Appellant sought judgment for damages and in-
junctive relief agair.st Defendants concerning the timely trans-
fer of property tax funds collected by Defendants for and on behalf 
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of Plaintiff-_C\ppellant and the transfer to Plaintiff-Appellant 
of all interest income earned on Plaintiff-Appellant's funds 
during the period that Defendant held those funds. Original ac: 
was brought by Plaintiff-Appellant concerning the tax years 19: 
1974 and 1975. First Amended Complaint included claims for th; 
tax year 1976. Plaintiff-Appellant brought Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment to determine liability for improper transfer 
funds from Defendants to Plaintiff. Judge David X. Winder on 
May 6, 1977 granted partial Summary Judgment as to liability 
and referred the issues of damages to trial. Plaintiff filed 
its Second Amended Complaint alleging grounds for damages. Tri: 
followed and Judge Jay E. Banks vacated and overruled the dec1s: 
of Judge David K. Winder and found no liability and consequenti 
no damages and no grounds for injunctive relief and dismissed 
Plaintiff's Complaint. Plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Plaintiff petitions this court to reverse the decision of 
the Third Judicial District Court, Judge Jay E. Banks presidinc, 
reinstate the decision of Judge David K. Winder and remand for 
trial for proper findings on damages and injunctive relief. 
Damages to be based upon the trust relationship of Defendants 
to Plaintiff and injunctive relief to be based upon the stat~~ 
requirements for the proper transfer of funds collected by one 
political entity for and on behalf of another. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
(Summary of Facts) 
Granite School District is dependent upon Salt Lake County 
for the collection of property taxes. During the years 1973, 
through 1977 Salt Lake County Treasurer collected the property 
taxes and held the funds collected for lengthy periods beyond the 
statutory transfer dates. While the funds were held by the Salt 
Lake County Treasurer, the funds were earning interest income 
which was given by the Treasurer to Salt lake County by deposit 
to the county's general fund. Granite School District seeks in-
junctive relief that all funds collected be timely transferred 
pursuant to statute and that Salt Lake County pay over to Granite 
School District the interest income that it unjustly received. 
FACTS IN DETAIL 
The Salt Lake County Treasurer is charged by statute to 
collect property taxes for all taxing districts within the county. 
The Treasurer is reimbursed for his expenses pursuant to statute 
and he is required to disburse those funds on a regular basis 
Llntil the final adjustment day on the last day of March of each year. 
1. Transfer Practice. In 1973, the last year of Salt Lake 
County Treasurer Sid Lambourne's term of office, the property tax 
collected by him was transferred to the Granite School District 
as shown in Exhibit 2P as follows: 
Date Transferred .Arr.aunt ~=ansfer~ed 
December 13, 1973 $ 5,853,000.00 
January 2, 1974 140,000.00 
January 7, 1974 4,024,000.00 
- 3 -
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Date Transferred 
February 1, 1974 
February 27, 1974 
May 28, 1974 
TOTAL 
l\.mount Transferred 
$ 1,646,000.00 
19,869.69 
2,066,886.32 
$13,749,756.01 
2. Transfer Dates. There are three transfer dates set 
out by statute. In Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §53-7-10, re-
quires that the County Treasurer pay the funds collected 
to the Board of Education within 30 days after the taxes are 
collected. In Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §59-10-66 requires 
all funds in the treasurer's hands collected for and due the 
School District be paid to the treasurer of the School District, 
each month. And in this same section (§59-10-66) the final 
costs are set on the last day of March of each year. #l 
3. 1974 - 1977 Transfer ?ractice. With the entry intc 
office of Salt Lake Treasurer Arthur Monson, the transfer prac-
tice of his office went fron bad to worse as follows: (Exhibit F· 
Date Transferred 
December 2 I 1974 
December 3 I 1974 
December 16, 1974 
December 19, 1974 
January 9 I 1975 
January 31, 1975 
June 12, 1975 
TOTAL 
- 4 -
Amount Transferred 
$ 142,000.00 
56,200.00 
2,900,000.00 
5,000,000.00 
3,000,000.00 
3,000,000.00 
1,224,128.14 
$15,322,328.14 
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1975 
Date Transferred Amount Transferred 
December 2' 1975 $ 1,561,453.00 
December 15, 1975 10,000,000.00 
January 5' 1976 3,015,643.00 
Februa:::-y 3' 1976 163,001.00 
March 31, 1976 1,876,367,51 
June 15, 1976 54,201.86 
December 17, 1976 16,018.38 
TOTAL $ 16,686,684.75 
Date Transferred 1976 Amount Transferred 
December 7 I 1976 $ 1,767,700.00 
December 13, 1976 9,713,500.00 
December 17, 1976 384,963.33 
December 28, 1976 692,000.00 
January 4, 1977 252,000.00 
March 31, 1977 2,842,945.17 
TOTAL $ 18,029,608.50 
Keeping in mind that by November 30th of each year Salt 
Lake County collected 99431292% of 1973 taxes, 99274363% of 1974 
taxes, 98586137% of 1975 taxes and 98168721% of 1976 taxes 
(Exhibit P-2). (Finding No. 8) 
~. Investment Practice. The Salt Lake County Treasurer 
began investing all funds received in his collections in 1974. 
Taking great pride in his investment increases to public funds 
and then promptly determined that no taxing district was more 
- 5 -
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appropriate to receive this windfall from his accurnen and 
expertise than was the Salt Lake County general fund to meet 
the expenses of Salt Lake County government. Admittedly, 
Salt Lake County was only one of the 48 taxing districts for 
whom he made collections (trp. 721 Finding No. 4), but after 
all, it was the county government that hired his staff, paid 
his salary, arranged his office accommodations and in general 
accompanied his concert. Only one principal governed. If ycJ 
have extra money, give it to the people who will do you the most 
good. That's called the scratch-my-back method of political 
survival a~d the Salt Lake County Treasurer followed that ?ath 
to the very penny of income earned. (Finding No. 34). 
5. The School District's Dilemma. A school district 
depends upon a ronthly flow of cash to meet its financial 
commitments. But, its major source of funds is property tax 
collections which accrue only once each year and are paid by 
November 30th of each year. For 1980, that will be approximate! 
75 million dollars. So the school district anticipates its cash 
flow demands by selling tax anticipation notes and by budgeting 
into its income projections interest income earned on the funds 
received at one time but needed only proportionately througho~ 
the year. When the property tax funds are collected but not 
transferred and the income earned but not paid over the b~dcet0 
the school district becomes of little use, the proJections ha~ 
no validity and the cash flow becomes an unmanageable problen. 
(trp 619). 
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fj. The Proposed Solution. The transfer of funds is as 
close to a mathmatical exercise in accounting as any procedure. 
Upon fixing of the mill levy and the evaluation, the percentage 
of all funds to be collected and the actual dollar figure auailable 
to the school district from the total collectable is accurately 
determinable. All of which is accomplished prior to assessment 
of taxes in October of each year. The slight fluctuations of 
abatements, redemptions or defaults cause a very minute change in 
that accounting, the last day of March of each year was set as 
the adjustment date for transfer of proportionate shares of de-
linquent taxes, interest, penalty, and costs which is to be accom-
plished monthly and finally on the last adjustment date. No one 
ever said that over-payment by the County Treasurer to a taxing 
district could not be as easily corrected or adjusted as under-
payment. (TR640). The only thing that was left to the responsibility 
of the parties was the transfer also of the income received from the 
funds from funds investment. The hypothetical emphasises the problem. 
In 1980, Salt Lake County will collect within a few dollars of 
$165,000,000 in property tax collections. Twenty-three percent of 
that amount or within a few dollars of $75,000,000 is collected 
for the Granite School District based upon assessed valuations and 
mill levy set by the School District. Granite School District should 
L.a.~~,2 2_~, ~ ~fall r2ce=._pts ~rans:er:!:"ed ur::cn col~ection which is within 
20 C:a~·s from actual receiDt and on the first day of each month of all 
funds actually in hand collected. 
- 7 -
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7. The Repayment of I~come Earned but not Paid Over. 
The final fact is that the School District has ~ot received 
the interest income earned on funds belonging to the School 
District which income was paid over to Salt Lake County. Usi~.: 
the county's figures of their income and the amounts actually 
earned 1974 through 1977, the county obtained $83, 000 in inco~, 
which was not earned on county funds collected but from the f~~ 
collected for the School District. That amount plus legal 
interest should be reimbursed to the School District for the 
tax years 1974 through 1976. (Finding No. 34) 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the decision of liability rendered by the 
lower court could properly be vacated and overruled by a dee is.: 
of the same court charged with considering the bifurcated 
issue of damages. 
2. Whether Defendants-Respondents properly transferred 
to Plaintiff-Appellant funds collected for Plaintiff within t~ 
statutory transfer periods pursuant to the statutory requiremer.: 
3. Whether interest income received from investment of 
Plaintiff's funds was improperly transferred to Defendant Salt 
Lake County to its unjust enrichment. 
4. Whether Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief 
to require the proper trar.s:'er o:': all funds collected plus ear:' 
income within 30 days after the funds are collected, and by the 
first day of each month of all funds in hand actually collectec 
with a final adjustment on the last day of March of each year. 
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ARGUMENT 
"Your money is the County's money because I say so." so 
the Salt Lake County Treasurer approaches his statutory re-
sponsibility of collecting taxes for 49 taxing districts in Salt 
Lake County. Not only does he keep the collections to the last 
possible moment to enhance his investment image, but then he gives 
the income to anyone he pleases. What he really says is, "Your 
money is the County's money because I say so." Thus began the 
unsavory task of telling the Treasurer that he misappropriated 
earned income by seeking judicial decision of two basic questions. 
How long can the Treasurer hold the collected funds and who should 
get the benefit of the income earned on invested funds. 
POINT I 
wI-IETHER THE DECISION OF LIABILITY RENDERED BY THE LOWER 
COURT COULD PROPERLY BE VACATED AND OVERRULED BY A DE-
C IS ION OF THE SAME COURT CHARGED WITH CONSIDERING THE 
BIFURCATED ISSUE OF DAMAGES. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah "shall have appellate 
jurisdiction ... to review all final judgments of the District Court .. 
In equity cases the appeal may be on questions of both law and 
fact ... " Utah Code Annotated, 1953 §78-2-2. 
The District Court "shall have original jurisdiction in 
all matters and ... appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts .. " 
Lltah Code Annotated, 1953 §78-3-4. 
The bifurcation of issues is discretionary with the trial 
court. Having bifurcated the issues the final judgment in the 
- 9 -
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case would have to be entered before any appeal could be taken. 
Twin Falls County vs. Knieval, 563P2d 45,98 Idaho 321 (1977) anc 
partial determinations based on motion which dispose of only pa:· 
of the issues are not final judgments for appeal. Lopez v. 
Hoffman, 4 2 3 P 2 d 4 2 9 , 77 N .1'!. 3 9 6 ( 196 2) . 
The issues bifurcated for discussion provided a basis 
for carrying the case to its final decision on the whole case 
and not on a piecemeal appeal of each bifurcated issue. The tt~ 
court takes each portion and renders decision until the whole 
case is completed and ripe for appeal. Gazin v. Hieber, 504 
P2d 1178, 8 Wash. App. 104 (1972) and Wheatland Irrigation Distri:: 
v. McGuire, 537 P2d 1128, hearing granted in part 552 P2d 1115 
rehearing 562 P2d 287 (Wyo. 1975). and Hayes v. Nielsen, 568 
P2d 905 (Wyo. 1977). The granting of summary judgment as to 
liability was not a "final order" but was "interlocutory" until 
after the case was tried on the issues of damages. The same car.· 
cl us ion was reached in Empress Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Price, 567 
P2d 350, 116 Ariz. 34 (1977). The final judgment for appeal was 
after the trial on damages following the partial summary judgment 
as to liability. See also North Point Consol. Irrigation Co. v. 
Utah S.L. Canal Co. 63 P812, 23 Utah 199 (Utah, 1901), Standa~ 
Steam Laundry v. Dale, 58P.1109, 20 Utah 469 (1899), and J.B. 
& R.E. Walker, Inc. vs. Thayn, 405 P2d 342, 17 Ut.2d 120 (1965). 
Appellant review was not that of the trial court as to is gra~~ 
of partial summary judgment but was the responsibility of the 
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Supreme Court after the proper determination of damages and 
a completion of the case as a whole with the entry of final 
judgment as to all remaining issues to be tried on a trial 
court level eminating for the trial court's original juris-
diction. 
The S·upreme Court of the State is the proper forum for 
review of the whole case after final determination of each of 
the parts of the case. Mid-Century Inc., Co. v. Pavlikowski 
576 P2d 748 (Nev. 1977) Central-Southwest Dairy Co-op v. American 
Bank of Commerce, 432 P2d 820, 78 N.M. 464 (1967) and Bowing v. 
Board of Trustees of Green River Community College, Dist. No. 
X, 534 P2d 1365, 85 Wash. 2d 300 (1975). 
The final determination of liability was made herein by 
Judge David K. Winder. It had the quality of res judicada as it 
was fully determanitive of that issue. It was not subject to 
interlocutory review but awaited finalization of the whole case. 
Clouver s. Spaniol Ford, Inc., 522 P2d 1360 (Wyo. 1979) as 
evidenced by defendants' Notice of Intent to Appeal upon com-
pletion of the whole case. 
POINT II 
WHETHER DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS PROPERLY TR.~NSFERRED 
FUNDS COLLECTED FOR PLAINTIFF WITHIN THE STATUTORY 
TRANSFER PERIODS PURSUANT TO THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS. 
Judge Winder made the following findings and conclusions 
concerning the improper withholding of funds from transfer to 
the School District: 
- 11 -
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Findings of Fact 
"l. The County Treasurer, pursuant to statute (53-7-10, 
UCA, 1953), is required to levy property taxes in the Granite 
School District at the rate set by the School District within 
the requirements set by law, collect the taxes and pay the same 
to the treasurer of the Granite School District within thirty 
days after the taxes are collected. 
2. The county Treasurer, pursuant to statute (59-10-66, 
UCA, 1953), shall pay to the Treasurer of Granite School Distric:. 
on the first day of each month, all monies in the Treasurer's 
hands collected for and due the School District. 
3. Any monies of the Granite School District collected 
and held by the County Treasurer for more than thirty (30) days 
is a violation of state law and all monies held by the County 
Treasurer for the Granite School District during any given monb 
should be paid over to the Granite School District on the first 
day of the subsequent month. 
4. The Salt Lake County Treasurer levied and collected 
property taxes for and in behalf of the Granite School District 
in each of the tax years of 1973 through 1976. 
5. The Salt Lake County Treasurer held monies collected 
for and in behalf of the Granite School District for more than 
thirty (30) days and did not pay to the Granite School District, 
monies which it held in the months of the tax years 1973 throug~ 
1976, on the first day of the month following the month the monW 
were collected. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Salt Lake County Treasurer is required (and has 
been so required since at least 1973) to pay to the Treasurer 
of the Granite School District within thirty (30) days after 
collection of property taxes by Defendant, the Plaintiff's share 
of said taxes. 
2. The Salt Lake County Treasurer collected certain prop-
erty taxes for each of the tax years 1973 through 1976, which the 
Salt Lake County Treasurer failed to pay to Plaintiff within the 
required thirty (30) day period. 
3. The Salt Lake County Treasurer having failed to pay 
to Plaintiff the property taxes collected for and in its behalf, 
caused the Plaintiff damages in each of those tax years. 
4. No finding, conclusion or ruling is made by this courrt 
concerning the amount of those damages or what the proper measure 
of damages should be. 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted 
and Plaintiff is hereby awarded Summary Judgment against Defendant 
finding the Defendant liable to Plaintiff for failure on the 
Defendant's part to pay to Plaintiff within the required thirty 
(30) day period, the property taxes collected by Defendant for 
each of the tax years, 1973 through 1976, which were collected by 
Defendant for and in behalf of Plaintiff pursuant to law." 
It is generally accepted law that where two statutes treat 
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the same subject the court will endeavor to interpret both 
to be valid and not contradictory. Park and Recreation Cornrnissi: 
v. Department of Finance 388 P2d 233, 15 Ut. 2d 110 (1964). 
State vs. Hunt, 368 P2d 261, 13 Ut. 2d 32 (1962). All statutes 
should be viewed liberally with an intent to effect the objects 
of the statutes. 
The object is to harmonize the statutes in accordance.witi 
the objective to make the statute carry out the intent and pur-
pose of the law. Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty 68 P2d 242 
(Utah, 1980). 
The two statutes governing in this action as previously 
cited are 53-7-10 and 59-10-66# 1 
Considering as a fact that 99% of all property taxes are 
paid by November 30th of each year and acknowledging that it t~ 
a few days to process the payments received. These two statuteo 
are to be construed to give validity to the process of collecL 
and to the proper payment of funds over to the separate entitic' 
for whom the funds were collected. Using the term "collected" 
as the day on which the payments were made and the term "in hanc 
collected" as the actual date on which the collected funds weu 
deposited to the account of the County Treasurer. The two sU~ 
are wholly compatible and give complete guidance to the Coun~ 
Treasurer as to the proper payment of funds collected for the 
School District. 
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u.c.;... §S3-7-10 (1953) i:irovides; 
A~ter the evaluation of proi:ierty has been extended on 
the assessment rolls, the county commissio er shall levy a 
tax on the taxable property in the respect ve school districts 
at such a rate as will, subject to limitat ons hereinafter set 
forth and as nearly may be, raise the amounts required by each 
board of education. Such taxes shall be collected and the county 
treasurer shall i:iay the same to the treasurer of said board within 
thirty days after it is collected, who shall hold the same sub-
ject to the order of the Board of education. 
In addition, U.C.A. § 59-10-66 (1953) provides: 
It is the duty of the county treasurer to pay to the 
other treasurer of each city, town, school district, and other 
taxing unit of the county, on the first day of each month, 
all monies in his ha!1ds collected for and due such city, town, 
school or taxing unit. The county treasurer shall pay to the 
treasurer of each city, town school district or other taxing 
unit, a proportionate share of delinquent taxes, interest, penalty, 
and costs on all tax sales and redemptions therefrom monthly, and 
shall make a final settlement with the differing taxing units 
on the last day of March of each year. (Emphasis Added.) 
14a 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of school land "must" be made within 90 dai'S of filing cf plat 
held not mandatory); State ex rel Right v. Park City School 
District, 133 P.128 (Utah 1913); (statute requiring tir.1ely he::: 
anC. filing of report as condition for subdivided school distric: 
is merely advisoty); Tanner 'l. Nelson, 70 P. 984 (Utah 1902) 
(statute calling for public meeting on bonds for funding schocl 
textbooks considered directory only) . 
A careful reading of the above cases that they merely 
lend support to the argument of the Plaintiff that the intent c: 
the legislature is the most fundamental rule of statutory coc· 
struction. In addition, all of these cases may be distinguishe,: 
from the i:1stant case in that there was no shewing of substant:; 
prejudice or injury to any of the interested parties as a re-
sult of failure to strictly comply with the statutes i!1 ':['cest:'.: 
POINT III 
WHETHER INTEREST r::co~ 1 :r: RECE:'.YED ??0' 1 I:l\.'ESTclE'.''.T 
OF PLAINTIFF' s n;:;os :;;,s r:'.PROPE'.l.LY T"'.<JSFERRED 
TO DEFENDANT Sf.LT LC,.I\E CC'..":·iTY TO ITS CY-.JCST Ei:-
RICHMENT. 
With respect to the collection and trans~er cf the ~a~ 
monies in question, the county treasurer has acted as an agent 
of Salt Lake County. 
U.C.A. §17-5-19 (1953) provides: 
"They [Board of County Comrnissioners] supervise 
the official conduct of all county officers and 
officers cf all precincts, districts and other 
subdivisions of the county (except municipal corp-
orations); see that they faithfully perform their 
duty, direct prosecutions for delinquencies, and if 
necessary, require them to renew their official 
bonds, make reports and present their books and 
accounts for inspection." 
- 17 -
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It is clear that the above statute provides the Board of 
county Commissioners with authority to exercise general super-
vision over the County Treasurer. Tooele County v. De LaMare, 
59 P.2d 1155 (Utah 1936). The fact that the County Treasurer is 
subject to general direction by County Commissioners makes Salt 
Lake County more than just an "unwilling" recipient of the prop-
erty tax monies and interest thereon. 
As a general rule, where a person acts for another who 
accepts and retains the benefits of the transaction, such other 
is deemed to ratify the transaction. Moses v. Archie McFarland & 
Son, 230 P. 2d 571 (Utah 1951.); see also 3 Am. Jur. 2nd Agency 
§175, at 560 (1962). A principal, after receiving information 
that an act has been done without actual authority by one acting 
on its behalf, must promptly elect to repudiate the act, if he 
wishes to avoid being bound as a principal. Moses v. Archie 
McFarland & Son, supra; see also 3 Am. Jur. 2nd Agency §175, at 
560 (1952). 
The following facts are established. Salt Lake County has 
been fully informed by virtue of this action that the Salt Lake 
County Treasurer has failed to pay over tax monies when due. 
Further, Salt Lake County has knowingly and consistently accepted 
all interest accrued on overdue tax monies. The County has never 
repudiated the acts of the County Treasurer with respect to the 
handling of tax monies, nor has it offered to return any of the 
accrued interest withheld by the County Treasurer contrary to statute. 
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The County's acquiescence in the conduct of the County 
Treasurer clearly shows ratification of the Treasurer's conduc: 
in this matter. On this basis alone, the County is liable :0 ~ 
the Treasurer's acts. 
Even if the County Tre.asurer is not the agent of Salt Lak, 
County, the County may not unjustly enrich itself at the ex 8en~ 
of the District. 
Defendants in their trial brief have acknowledged that 
the County Treasurer "may indeed be a trustee of Plaintiff's 
tax monies." (p.26,tr ~ 2 ~~~eed, they would have difficulty in mab-
taining a contrary position in the light of Board of Education•. 
Daines, 166 p.977 (Utah 1917). In Daines, the Court held that 
the County Treasurer had no right to be compensated for expenses 
I 
incurred in the collection of school property taxes from the til 
monies due the school. In the course of its discussion, the 
Court stated: 
"School funds in this state, in one sense, 
are deemed trust funds, and, under our laws, 
are to be devoted strictly far school purposes." 
Id., at 979. 
Plaintiff has previously contended by virtue of Utah law 
that the County Treasurer is an agent of Salt Lake County, and 
that the Treasurer and the County Commissioner acted as a single 
entity in this matter. Assuming, arguendo, that the above facts 
are not the case, Salt Lake County, as recipient of the transfer 
of trust funds, should not be allowed to retain the income earne: 
on tax monies in question. 
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The Restatement of Trusts (2d) §289 (1958) states: 
"If the trustee in breach of trust, transfers trust 
property and no value is given to the transferor, the 
transferee does not hold the property free of the trust, 
although he had no notice of the trust." 
In such a case as described in the above quotation, the 
beneficiary can charge the transferee as a constructive trustee 
of the property, and the transferee will be liable for profits 
from investment of the money, or at the very least, interest 
upon the transferred funds at the legal rate. Id, at §292. 
Utah courts of law recognize the equitable doctrine of 
constructive trusts. See e.g. Nielson v. Rasmussen, 558 P.2d 
511 (Utah 1965). 
During the years in question, the County retained interest 
earned on tax monies improperly withheld in violation of state 
statutes. The tax monies gathered by the Treasurer were and are 
trust funds. Interest on the funds has been retained, and 
credited to the account of the County. The County's retention of 
the funds is a classic case of unjust enrichment. Accordingly, 
the County should be obliged to pay over any income received upon 
the tax monies in question. 
The funds so held for the School District are funds held 
in trust. Salt Lake County is a trustee of tax monies collected 
for Granite School District. Finding No. 16. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a trust is sufficiently 
established where "(the) trust estate is definite, the trustee 
is certain, and the purpose of the trust and use of the fund is 
definite, certain and particularly characterized." Duchesne 
County v. State Tax Commission, 140 P. 2d 335, 337-38 (Utah, 1943) · 
A public agency may serve as a trustee. Id. Utah statutes govern-
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ing the collection, use, and disposition of tax monies col 
on behalf of school districts demonstrate that counties hole 
such monies in trust. 
In State v. Stanton County, 161 N.W. 264 (Neb. 1917), 
the State of Nebraska brought an action to recover from Stanton 
County, the board and care of patients committed to the state 
hospital from said county. The county was authorized by state,, 
upon being notified of the charges for its patients in the 
state hospital to add such charges to the next state tax to be 
levied in the county and to then pay the amounts that were le''ii 
into the state treasury. The county levied the tax but then ~-
clined to pay the tax proceeds into the state treasury. The~~ 
held that it was obligated to do so indicating that the county~ 
the money in trust for the state. As a consequence, the court 
ruled that the county was liable for interest on the monies ~r~ 
the time that it was due to be paid to the state: 
The money was collected for, and belonged to, the State, 
and was wrongfully withheld by the county. While so 
wrongfully held, the county is properly chargeable 
with the use of the money and should pay interest 
thereon as found by the referee. 
Id. at 266. 
In State v. City and County of Milwaukee, 149 N.W. 579 
(Wisc. 1914), the state as plaintiff sued the city for the 
amount of fines received by the city in its courts and payable 
to the state. The court stated that the funds were trust ~ 
and held that where the city had failed to pay the state the 
amount of fines collected by it, interest was due from the tirne 
the funds were to be paid. Id. at 583; see also Booth v. Pa~ 
197 A. 50 (N.J. 1934) (city ordered to pay interest on delay~ 
tax payment to county) 
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In sum, both ~tah stat~tes and the common law impose the 
office and duties of a public trustee upon political subdivision, 
such as Salt Lake County, which hold tax monies collected for 
other units of government. 
The state laws provide for funding of a basic school pro-
0ram based on a formula called a weighted pupil unit. Each year 
that basic program is met from assessment of real property taxes 
within the School District augmented by the state supplied funds 
?ursuant to limits established by the legislature. The School 
District is then left with the responsibilities of administering 
these funds. Whatever the School District earns on these funds 
by investment, or obtains by a gift, or from other means such 
as tax anticipation notes or sale of property or student fees 
are funds left to the discretional use of the School Board but 
are to be used for School District purposes only. Board of 
Education vs. Daines, Ibid. Such extraordinary funds have never 
been accounted for in determining the basic school program dic-
tated by the state weighted pupil formula. 
For Salt Lake County to allege that a windfall of income 
is the County's by way of the state already supporting the basic 
school program is to allege that unjust enrichment is all right 
as long as someone else picks up the deficit or curtails their 
cro8rams so that the county can take advantage of its wrongful 
3ccrocriation of those funds. Public policy dictates the separation 
of governmental entities and the separate responsibility of managing 
the tax payers funds under their care. 
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The issue of whether a county holds schooi district fir,.J: 
in public trust ha.s been di.:::-ectly 1 i tigated r.0w in at least t~<: 
other neighboring jurisdiction. Pomona City School District " 
---.:.· 
Payne, 50 P.2d 822 (Cal. ,\pp. 1935). In Pomona Ci.":.~', the sc~oc 
district, plaintiff, maintained its school '.'unds on deposit in 
the treasury of Los Angeles County. The County Treasurer foL:.·. 
the administrative practice of depositing the funds in state a:.: 
national banks pursuant to state statutes. However, the co11n<:· 
treasurer did not credit the school district with any of the i:.· 
terest earned on school funds. The Pomona School District s1ec'. 
claiminc a right to the interest on that portion of school dist:: 
funds which represented its share. The c'.Jurt framed the issues 
as follows: 
Decision of this case we believe rests upon the deter-
mination of the status of the school funds while 
they are in the custody oc the county. Is the county 
the owner of such '.'u:. ::o, ~r is tl".e :::::c·~:.t~· s:..::-.:cl·' the 
trustee for the bene~~~ of che schcc~ ~istric~? If 
accretions belong to such owner; but es trustee, 
the cc;..;.r--.t:z· r,.;ould ha~:e nc ownershi;:::. -·· '::he :~:-:ds or 
in their interest incre~ents. I~. at 823. 
The co~rt held that the countv was ~erely a trustee of 
the school funds deposited in its care, and as such, could not 
enrich its own coffers with interest increments upon money place: 
in its custody by the school district. It indicated that its 
decision rested not only on statutory interpretation, but also 
on general common law principles. Id. at 825. 
California and other courts have applied Pomona School 
District in analogous situations. Metropolitan Water Distric~· 
Adams, 32 Cal. 2d 620, 197 P.2d 543 (1948); Ostly v. Saper, 30) 
P.2d 946 (Cal. App. 1957); Board of La"-1 Library Trustees of Les 
Angeles County v. Lorery, 154 P.2d 719 (Cal. App. 1945). See 
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3 lso, Lynn v. Longview, 131 P.2d 164 (\·;ash. 1942). 
In State of Missouri ex rel Fort Zumwalt School District, 
et al, Realtors vs. Dichherker Auditor of St. Charles County 
and St. Charles Missouri, 576 So. 2 2d 532 (Mo. Feb. 13, 1979) 
~he Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed a Writ of Mandamus filed 
by the Circuit Court which ordered the County Auditor to transfer 
o~er interest income earned on School District funds at the sa~e 
tix0 as the funds themselves were transferred. 
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"This is an appeal by appellant, Dickherber, the auditor 
of St. Charles County from a writ of mandamus entered on .!lay c:, 
1977 by the circuit court of St. Charles County commanding the 
appellant to countersign checks or warrants issued by the 
treasurer or collector of St. Charles County for the payment of 
interest on school tax monies collected by the county." 
"This proceeding has a long history and involves an 
interpretation of law relating to the payment of interest on 
school tax monies received and deposited by the proper officials 
of St. Charles County. The precise issue is whether the interes: 
on school tax monies deposited in authorized depositaries shou~ 
be paid to the treasurers of various school districts in the 
county or whether such interest should be credited to the gener::I 
revenue fund of the county." 
Realtors prayed that the circuit court issue its writ of 
mandamus commanding the treasurer and collector to "forthwith 
deliver to each Treasurer-Relator interest earned on tax monies 
received by Respondents in behalf of each Relater-School Distric' 
."Respondents answered and relied upon §52 360 RSMo 1969 
n2 contending that such interest "shall go to the general revenu< 
fund of the County." Respondents contended that it is the duey 
of the collector to transfer interest on all funds to the credit 
of the general revenue fund of the county. 
The circuit court made its alternative writ absolute and 
ordered and enjoined respondents to pay to relators school distr:: 
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the interest earned on all school tax monies received and in-
vested by them. 
The Missouri statutes dealing with payment of funds to 
the school districts are not much different than those of Utah 
in that a regular monthly day is set for payment ("at least 
once in every month", 165.071 R.S. Mo., 1969). The Missouri 
statutes provided for disposal of interest income earned on 
the general county funds to the general revenue fund of the 
county but such requirement was not statutorily applied to funds 
collected for the school district. 
The court held that the trial court did not err in issuing 
the writ and that the interest on deposited school tax funds go 
to the respective treasurers of the relator school districts 
cather than to the general revenue fund of St. Charles County. 
"The resolution we make comports with the general 
principle that the interest on public funds designated for a 
specific purpose follows those funds in the absence of an un-
equivocal legislative expression otherwise. See annotation,143 
A.L.R. 1341, 1342 (1943); State Highway Commission v. Spainhower, 
504 s.w. 2d 121 (Mo. 1973); Pomona City School District v. Payne, 
50 P.2d 822 (Cal. App. 1935). In Pomona, the court expressed 
the principle in terms of the applicability to school funds. 
The issues were similar to the present case, and involved t.he 
question whether the interest on school funds was to go to the 
county or to the school district. 
the court stated: 
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"lie are also confronted with the primary law that interes: 
is an accretion or increment to the principal fund earning it, 
and unless lawfully separated therefrom becomes a part thereof 
. This was the common-law rule, and unless the cl.eposi tarj' 
acts clearly demonstrate an intention to deprive school distnc:; 
of such common-law right to interest accruals, they should reta:· 
such interest." 50 P.2d at 825. 
v. Spainhower, supra. 
See also State Highway Co!1'.m1s 0. 
"We, therefore, conclude that based upon statutory inter-
pretation and public policy that interest on deposited school 
funds are payable to the treasurer of the six-director school 
districts and that the trial court did not err." 
State Highway Commission v. Spainhower 504 S .1'7. 2d 121 
(Mo. 1973). Involved an action for declaratory judgment with 
regard to whether interest on state road funds should be paid 
into such fund. The circuit court found that the interest and 
income frame investment of the fund had to be credited to such 
fund and not diverted to the general revenue. The issue is whet:· 
interest from investment of the state road fund must be credited 
by the State Treasurer to the state road fund to be used for 
highway purposes as contended by the Highway Cornrnission and as 
found by the trial court, or whether such interest is to be ere:: 
to the general revenue fund as contended by the State Treasure:. 
Appellant argues that in the absence of a requirement in Sectic:. 
15 that income or interest from the investment of state monies 
in a special fund be credited to that fund, the General Assernb~ 
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has the power to provide for the disposition of such increments. 
The court found that it was clear that no money was to be di-
verted from that state road fund for any other use than that for 
which the use of the road fund was designated ie. state highway 
purposes. And that interest income on highway funds belonged 
to the highway fund. This problem has been considered and the 
same result reached in the State of Oregon where a taxpayer 
petitioned for writ of mandamus to compel the state treasurer 
to return to the state's general fund certain money accumulated 
as interest on several special funds of the state, one of which 
was the state highway fund. The treasurer had credited such 
interest to the particular funds involved. The highway funds 
involved were moneys received from various motor vehicle and 
fuel taxes. Article IX, Section 3, Constitution of Oregon, 
r2quires that "the proceeds" from any such tax "be used ex-
:lusively" for the construction and maintenance, etc., "of public 
highways, roads and streets within the state of Oregon." 
"An examination of all of the authority * * * is convincing 
that the legislature cannot divert interest from these funds. 
* * * 
"It is recognized that the people's approval of the amend-
ment to Article IX Section 3 provides no actual expression of a 
will and intent that interest that may be earned by the accum-
ulated revenues controlled by the amendment should accrue to the 
highway fund. There is a strong inference, however, that the clear 
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intent of the people to compel the specific revenues to be 
used for one purpose implies that it would include all of the 
terest that would accr'Je during the State Treas•Jrer' s holding,, 
the revenues for their eventual use." s~ate 'i. Straub, 240 ':r. 
272, ~00 P.2d 229, 232 (ba:tc 196:0). See also 81 A C.J.S. States 
§155 ap. 1192: "Interest earned by a deposit af s9ecial funds c; 
increment accruing thereto, and not to the general funds oft~ 
state." 
"In Lawson v. Baker(Tex.Civ .. ".pp.) 1920, 220 S.IL 260, 
the Texas Court held that interest became a part of a similar 
highway fund in :Cexas and that the co;csti tutional limi tatiof' :_,. 
the Texas Co:tstitution as to the use of the fund prohibited t~ 
legislature from diverting the interest away from the fund . 
At 143 A.L.R. beginning at page 1341 is an annotation on the 
liability of municipalities for interest earned on special fi,;~.~' 
held by the treasurer of the municipality. The annotators ha~ 
collected cases relating to interest on the funds of a school 
district or drainage district, for example, held by a county 
treasurer. These cases are significant in that they generally 
hold that interest must follow a special fund and be used for ~ 
benefit of the fund or for the purpose f:::r ·.·i'.ci:::h the ±'und ':1as 
created. See particularly PorrLo:i..a_ c: +::' Sch0c2._ District ;;· !?a~·ne 
1935, 9 Cal.App.2d 510, 50 P.2d 8~2. 
This same cr:i:--.c2-0si_r_:)f', :s to j__:1ter-=:st ·?a~ned on state high',.,'J: 
funds is reached by Utah State Attorney General's opinion re-
quiring the Utah State Treasurer to turn over all interest ear~ .• 
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the 
o:1 state hiqhway funds to the Ctah State Highway Cor:irnission 
rather than the depositing of such earned income to the State 
general fund. (Attorney General's opinion No. 
19 
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Under Utah statutes, the property tax levied is to be 
collected by the County Treasurer, paid to the Treasurer of 
the Board of Education "who shall hold "c:he same subject to 
the Order of the Board of Education" Sec. 53-7-10. The Board 
of Education shall le~a property tax solely for educational 
purposes within the school district. 53-7-8 and 53-7-9 and 
53-7-16(a) and (b) and 53-7-19 and 53-7-23. Each provide for 
tax levys for designated school purposes. ~he funds of the 
district have no other purposes and are levied under statutory 
authority for those purposes only. 
Most recently the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed thes; 
same issues: _'l_e_a_r_s_·,_• . __ L_i_t_t_l_e_R_o_c_k_S_c_h_o_o_l __ D_i_s_~_'-_r_i_c_t_, 5 9 3 s. ,,, . 
(Ark. Feb. 4, 1980). 
School district and others brought action to enjoin op-
eration of ordinance of county quorum court whereby interest on 
school taxes was deposited in county general fund and not pass~ 
on to the school districts, with defendants asking that school 
districts pay a pro rata share of certain expenses incurred 
for assessment and collection of the taxes. The Chancery court 
held ordinance illegal and allowed only the assessor to collect 
his expenses, and defendants appealed. In effect, the ordina~e 
provided that the county could use the tax money to earn money 
for the count~--the interest earned not being passed on to the 
school districLs. 
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The appellants responded and counterclaimed defending 
the legality of the ordinance. In addition, they asked that 
the school districts pay a pro rata share of certain expenses 
incurred for the collection of the taxes. In the case of the 
county assessor a claim was made for $37,700 for "rentals and 
other contracts" and $38,000 was claimed for ten vehicles used 
by the assessor's office. Over $24,000 was claimed on behalf 
of the collector for "rentals and other contracts" and over 
$9,000 on behalf of the treasurer for the same expense. The 
proof showed that the appellants' claim for these rentals was 
largely based on what the rental value would be of the space 
occupied in the Pulaski County Courthouse by these various 
county offices. 
The chancellor held thattheordinance was illegal, 
that the interest earned on such tax money belonged to the legal 
entities for which it was collected. The chancellor also de-
clared that the law provided that only the assessor's office 
could charge these entities its expenses and that no other county 
officer was authorized to collect for his expenses. Therefore, 
the chancellor denied all requests for charges claimed by county 
officers other than the assessor's. The total amounts claimed 
by the assessor, which covered automobiles and the rental value 
of space, were allowed. 
Mears and the other appellants appeal the judgment of the 
chancellor and argue that the use of the tax money to earn interest 
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is not prohibited by law and that the chancellor should have 
allowed the other county officials to collect for their ex-
penses. The Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's decree. 
The Court held: "Clearly on point is Pomona City School Dist-
rict v. Payne, 9 Cal. App2.d 510, 50 P.2d 822 (1935), which 
held that interest on school taxes was part of the principal 
and belonged to the schools absent legislative action. We 
relied on Pomona in Miles v. Gordon, 234 Ark. 525, 353 S.W.2d 
157 (1962), when we held that Article 16, Section 12 of the 
Constitution, which prohibits taking money out of the state 
treasury without an appropriation, did not apply to interest on 
tax money when the two were separated by legislation. In 
view of Article 16, Section 11, our reasoninq in Miles, and the 
absence of legislative action, there is no doubt the interest 
belongs to the school districts." 
In the State of New Mexico ex rel Board of County Commis-
sioners of Bernalillo County vs. Monlaya, Director of the State 
Department of Finance 575 P.2d 605, 91 N.W. 421(1978)the court 
held that interest accruing on proceeds of bonds issued by co@~ 
to finance construction of a county juvenile detention home 
was required to be used for the purpose for which the bonds weu 
issued. The county argued that there was no statute prohibiti~ 
the accruina interest fro~ beina Gsed for ~he general county 
funds. The court held: "-'ibo·.i~ a special statc;tory provision, 
the general rule is that interest is an accretion or increment 
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=o the principal fund earning it and becomes a part of that 
~~nd. The court cited Pamona City School District vs. Payne, 
Ibid. Bordy vs. Smith 150 Neb 272, 34 N.W. 2d 331 (1948) and 
state v. Straub 240 Oregon 272, 400 P.2d 229 (1963) (interest 
on State School Fund and Cormnissioners of Woburn Cemetary vs. 
Treasurer of \1/oburn 64 N.f. 2d 627, (~lass., 1946) required that 
interest earned on cenetary perpetual care fund should be 
keot separate from the county general fund and under the 
control of the Cemetary Board. 
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POI)JT IV 
WHETHER PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO 
REQUIRE THE PROPER TR~NSFER OF ALL FUNDS COLLECTED PLes 
EARNED INCOME WITHIN 3 0 DAYS .2\FTER THE FUNDS ARE COLLECTE: 
AND BY THE FIRST DAY OF EACH MONTH OF ALL FUNDS IN HA~D 
.l..CTUALLY COLLECTED WITH A FINAL ACJC'ST~!ENT ON THE LAST o.:·, 
OF MARCH OF EACH YEAR. 
Injunctive relieve lies in equity when the Salt Lake 
County Treasurer as a trustee wrongfully transfered the funds 
to the wrongful enrichment of the Co·c.nty General Fund. There., 
no dispute that the County has consistently diverted all inte~i 
earned on tax monies improperly withheld to its own purposes. 
It has consistently refused to tender such money to the Distri~ 
Such conduct constitutes an intentional and wrongful abuse of 
trust justify~~g the imposition cf compound interest. 
As a consequence of the County's breaches of trust, the 
District has been denied the interest it could have earned, if 
it had the use of the tax monies on the dates they were required 
to be paid. This is the true measure of the District's loss for 
which it must be compensated. See In re Listman's Estate, supra 
197 P. at 602. 
As an alternative measure of damages and to prevent unjust 
enrichment, the District is at least entitled to a sum equal ta 
the interest which the County earned or could have earned ·.viul2 -
had District monies in its possession. 
In Listman's Estate, the Utah Supreme Court held that an 
executor who failed to comply with a court order directing him 
to invest estate monies in government bonds, and instead invesu: 
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in a bank which failed, was liable as a trustee for the 
principal and interest which would have accrued had the ex-
ecutor invested in government bonds. As stated b~ the Court: 
The actual loss sustained by the estate ought to be the 
measure of damages, we think, under the facts and 
circumstances of this case, where the specific direction 
of the court's order was to invest in bonds that would 
have earned for the respondents no more than 4-1/4 per-
cent interest per annum. 
Id. at 602. 
Such a sum should include compound interest where a 
trustee intentionally and wrongfully diverts and uses trust 
funds for his own private purposes the court may require 
compound interest. See In re Listman's Estate, supra, 197 P. 
at 602; Gordon vs. Brunson, 253 So. 2d 183 (Ala. 1971); Pullis 
v. Somerville, 117, S.W. 736 (Mo. 1909). 
Assuming, arguendc, that Salt Lake Count] is net a 
Trustee of monies collected for Granite School uistrict, Salt 
Lake County is nonetheless liable co Granite School District 
for interest at the legal rate for the unlawful delay in 
paying a legitifuate indebtedness. 
As a general rule, a debt is any lia!1lity to pay a sum 
certain whether that liability arises by contract or is imposed 
by law without contract. 2 6 C. J. S. Debt at 3 ( 19 5 6) • 
A "statutory obligation in the nature of a debt bears 
interest even though the statute creating the obligation fails 
to provide for it." United States v. United Drill Corp., 183 
F.2d 998, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1950); see also, Reserve Supply Corp. 
v. National Labor Relations Board, 317 F.2d 785, 789 (2d. Cir. 
1%3). Units of local or state government are not exempt from 
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the above rule. Milwaukee County v. Schmidt, 187 N.W. 2d 77 
(Wis. 1971); City of Wauwatosa v. Union Free High School Dist., 
252 N.W. 351 (Wis. 1934). In Milwaukee County, interest was 
allowed on state aid adjudged due to counties from the state 
department of health. In City of Wauwatosa, a plaintiff city 
brought an action against a school district for the payment of 
tuition owed to the city under a statute which required schcol 
districts in which no high school was maintained to pay the 
tuition of students residing in such districts, but who were 
attending high school in other districts. The court held that 
the plaintiff was entitled to recover monies due for the tuiti~ 
of defendant's students who were attending the city's high 
school plus interest on such monies. 
The long standing rule i:-i Utah and the common law is that 
interest is allowed on debts overdue even if there is no sta~u 
providing for interest. Wasatch Mining Co. v. Crescent Mining 
Company, 24 P. 586 (Utah 1890), aff'd 151 U.S. 317, 38 L.Ed. 
177 (1894); Goodbe v. Young, 82 U.S. 562, 565, 21 L.Ed. 250, 
251, (1873). 
Political subdivisions are not exempt from the general 
obligation to pay interest on their overdue debts. Baker Lumber 
Co. v. A. A. Clark Co., 178 P. 764 (Utah 1919); Wilson v. Salt 
Lake City, 174 P. 847 (Utah 1918). In Baker Lumber Co., t'.12 
Supreme Court held that a school district was required to ?aY ' 
rerest at the legal rate on a debt owed to companies which fun~ 
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materials and labor for the construction of a school building. 
concluding that there was no reason why a public corporation should 
be treated differently from individuals, upon failure to meet 
legally authorized obligations, the Court said: 
Public policy, it seems to us, should require a public 
corporation to meet its obligations legally authorized 
when due, and upon failure to do so that it be subjected 
to the same duty as probate individuals -- to reimburse 
the creditor for his forebearance or delay in receiving 
what is his due. 
Baker Lumber Co. v. A. A. Clark Co., supra, 178 P. at 770. 
In the case at bar, there are no legitimate grounds in 
either public policy or law, for exempting Salt Lake County from 
an obligation to reimburse Granite School District for the delay 
in receiving tax monies due to the District. To permit Salt Lake 
County to escape paying interest would be to provide the worst 
~css~ble example to private citizens in settling their debts and 
Moreover, it 1vould remove any incentive to Salt 
La~e County to meet its statutory obligations in the future. 
Therefore, Plaintiff should be entitled to recover interest on all 
overdue sums at the legal rate of six percent from the dates the 
sums should have been paid. U.C.A. §15-1-1 (1953); Baker Lumber 
Co. v. A. A. Clark Co., supra, 178 P. 764. 
Such overdue sum should include compound interest. Utah 
courts have ruled that a creditor -- in the absence of an agree-
rnent -- is entitled to interest on all interest due and payable 
at the legal rate of six percent per annum. Farnsworth vs. Jensen, 
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217 P.2d 571 (Ctah 1950); Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 145 P. 19J6 
(Utah 1915); see also U.C.A. §15-1-1 (1953). 
V. CONCLUSION 
Salt Lake County is a public trustee of tax monies collect 
for Granite School District. The School District's funds are ~c-
the County's funds no matter the opinion of the County Treasu~= 
to the tontrary. Utah law requires the County Treasurer to ?~ 
such money in his hands collected to the District en the first 
day of each month. In failing to pay tax monies when lawfully 
during the tax years 1973 through 1977, the County Treasurer i~ 
tentionally comini tted a breach of trust. He compounded his mis· 
appropriation of funds by retaining interest earned on the tax 
monies and paying the same to his principal, the general fund o:! 
Salt Lake County. 
At law, the measure the D1s::rict is that sum 
which will comi:;er:sa':e the District fer the loss of t:ie use of it: 
money. Specifically, the measure is that interest which the 
District could ha'!e earned b~· lac,v"f:.il in,_,estment ; if the County 
had made timely payments. At equity as alleged, the District 
measure of damages is the sum which the County Treasurer earned 
on the monies wrongfully detained and paid over to the general 
fund of Salt Lake County plus legal interest from the date of 
payment to Salt Lake County general fund until paid to Plainti'.' 
herein. 
This judgment of Judge David K. Winder should be reinstate·: 
the interest income due determined by remand to the District 
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court for a proper determination of damages at equity plus legal 
interest and for injunctive relief requiring proper and stat-
utorily required timely transfer of funds. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of January, 1981. 
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M. Byon Fisher 
M. Byron Fisher 
Charles B. Casper 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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CERTIFICATE OF ~11-\ILDiG 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT to Ted Cannon, 
Salt ~ake County Attorney a~d Bill Thomas Peters, Special 
Deputy County Attorney, Atcor~e;s for ~efendants, Respondents 
and Cross Appellants, 400 Chancellor Building, 220 South 200 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 postage prepaid on this 0~ 
day of January, 1981. ----
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
THE GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT, a 
body politic of the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic and ARTHUR MONSON, 
Salt Lake County Treasurer, 
Defendants, Respondents, 
and Cross Appellants. 
Case No. 17175 
ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF - APPELLANT 
Plaintiff inadvertently left off the citation to Attorney 
General's Opinion cited on page 30 of its Brief. That citation 
is Opinion No. 77-002 dated January 25, 1977, a copy of the opinion 
is included in the transcript of record pp. 72-75. 
~ 7 #(day of DATED this  January, 1981 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
By: /I{./$~ F..::::h!t 
M. Byrl'lFiSher 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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